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3.1  Introduction 
In the United Kingdom in  1991 personal sector saving accounted for E42 
billion of a total personal sector disposable income of &410  billion. To  under- 
stand the relationship between taxation and savings it is critical to focus on 
behavior at the household level, where after-tax returns on particular assets can 
be precisely defined. It is also useful to separate two stages of decision mak- 
ing-how  much to save and how to save it-although  these will not usually 
be independent. In this paper we  will look predominantly at the second of 
these decisions, although the evolution of the level of aggregate savings’ will 
be considered when we look at the U.K. experience over the last 20 years in 
section 3.2 below. 
Although many of the anomalies in the United Kingdom’s tax treatment of 
assets and asset income have been ironed out during the past decade, it remains 
(in common with many other systems that have evolved over a considerable 
length of time) characterized by a ranking of pretax returns that differs mark- 
edly from that of posttax returns. Tax incentives have joined, and in some cases 
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1. We will try to use “saving” to indicate flows and “savings” to indicate stocks throughout this 
paper to reduce ambiguity. 
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replaced, economic incentives in determining the allocation of saving. In addi- 
tion, though, the government may want to use the tax system as an instrument 
to increase the level of aggregate savings or divert saving into a particular vehi- 
cle and will therefore introduce a nonneutral tax specifically for that purpose. 
In the United Kingdom this has usually resulted in new acronyms, with the 
advent of  tax-exempt special savings accounts (TESSAs) or personal equity 
plans (PEPS),  for example, both discussed below. The purpose of this paper is 
to examine the tax incentives in existence for the different forms of household 
saving in the United Kingdom and to consider the distribution of personal sec- 
tor wealth across these assets. 
An important distinction to make in this area is that between intermediated 
household saving and saving through direct investment. A complete treatment 
of the taxation of saving requires a complete treatment of the taxation of direct 
investment, in particular for the self-employed. By becoming self-employed or 
registering as a company, individuals can enjoy tax relief on saving in assets 
that become treated as investment for tax purposes. For obvious reasons we 
cannot, in this paper, comprehensively treat the taxation of saving through di- 
rect investment, and so we choose simply to ignore such forms of saving and 
consider only intermediated household saving. We do, however, consider hous- 
ing and mortgages to be a form of household saving, as is conventional, even 
though these could be interpreted as saving through investment. 
In the subsections below we summarize the existing tax regime and report 
the important changes instigated in the U.K. tax system in recent years. Section 
3.2 looks at the household balance sheet for the U.K. personal sector and 
briefly considers how this has changed over time along with the distribution of 
wealth. Sections 3.3-3.6  consider the taxation of specific asset types in more 
detail and examine more closely the extent to which the personal sector has 
responded to special tax incentives. Section 3.7 concludes the paper. 
3.  I.  I 
The two most important taxes that have implications for saving in the U.K. 
personal sector are income tax and capital gains tax (CGT), as opposed to 
National Insurance and VAT, which are equally important from a revenue point 
of  view. In the 1990-91  tax year,  25.7 million people paid a total of E59.6 
billion  in  income tax,  and  E1.4  billion  in  CGT revenue  was  raised  from 
165,000  individuals. In addition, however, about El  .3 billion was raised from 
inheritance tax (IHT), but throughout most of this paper we will be more con- 
cerned with income tax and CGT. This is in part because very few individuals 
actually pay IHT (of the order of one-tenth of the estates notified for probate- 
representing about 30,000 individuals each year), but also because many U.K. 
commentators (for example, Kay  and King  1990; IFS  Capital Taxes Group 
1988) have shown that IHT is relatively easy to avoid. For completeness, how- 
ever, we describe IHT briefly in section 3.3 below. 
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Income tax is payable by  any tax unit on income (above their personal tax- 
free allowance) from many forms of savings and is charged at a basic rate of 
25 percent and a higher rate of 40 percent. Currently the single person’s allow- 
ance stands at &3,445,  and the higher rate threshold is &23,700  of taxable in- 
come. (In his budget of April 1992, the chancellor introduced a reduced rate 
band of 20 percent to apply to the first &2,000  of taxable income. However, no 
data exist as yet for the impact of this reform on savings, and it is expected 
that only 4 million people will pay  the reduced rate.* Consequently, for the 
purposes of this paper we will define the “current” tax system to be the pre- 
April 1992 tax system.) 
Capital gains tax operates in a similar way although the distinction between 
capital gains and income as defined by the tax system is not always clear. In- 
vestors receive an exemption of &5,800  per annum, below which any gains are 
entirely tax-free, and above which any real  gains are taxed at the investor’s 
marginal rate of income tax. 
In reality the tax advantage or disadvantage associated with a particular asset 
will depend upon a number of other elements. A common measure of tax privi- 
lege, the “effective tax rate” (ETR), is computed by taking the ratio of the tax 
payment to the real pretax return. The three elements in this calculation-tax 
payments, inflation, and pretax yields-can  vary across individual, time, and 
asset accordingly. First, the pretax yield on intermediated saving will depend 
on the way that the financial intermediary’s portfolio itself is taxed. More im- 
portant, however, is that some savings tax payments are calculated on nominal 
returns, and consequently the tax penalty of such assets is made significantly 
more severe in times of high inflation. Finally, tax exemptions offer signifi- 
cantly higher advantage to high-rate taxpayers than basic-rate taxpayers, and 
despite the fact that only 1.6 million people paid the higher rate in 1989, the 
effective tax rates can often be significantly lower for such individuals and as 
such the total effects could be quite large. 
A final issue that clouds the analysis of savings taxation is the well-known 
process of capitalization of tax privileges into asset prices or pretax yields. In 
the  United  Kingdom this  effect has  been  strong in the market for owner- 
occupied housing, but a less well known example exists in the case of  low- 
yield National Savings Certificates (see Saunders and Webb 1988). The effect 
of capitalization is to shift the benefit of the tax privilege from the investors 
who own the asset to the people who invested in the asset before it became 
privileged. The actual (risk-adjusted) returns realized by investors are signifi- 
cantly equalized by this process. 
2. It is worth noting, however, that a significant portion of these 4 million reduced-rate taxpayers 
will be pensioners, and so much of the taxable income will be unearned and the reduced rate band 
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3.1.2  Major Changes in Tax Regimes 
Although this paper seeks primarily to address the current U.K. tax system, 
any investigation of personal saving that has a time-series element would need 
to account for some important changes in the tax regime in recent years, in 
particular in the past decade. The majority of major changes and trends in the 
taxation of savings occurred in the 1980s, and their net result has been to equal- 
ize effective tax rates across assets over the time period concerned. This pro- 
cess is shown in figure 3.1, which is reproduced from the report of the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies Capital Taxes  Working Party  (IFS Capital Taxes Group 
1989). The equalization has been aided by falling inflation, however, and figure 
3.2 presents ETRs by asset calculated at constant inflation-showing  distinctly 
less convergence over the 11 years. Remember that the ETR is the tax paid 
expressed as a proportion of the pretax return, and those calculated in the fig- 
ures were calculated on the assumption of constant (real) pretax returns across 
assets-almost  certainly unrealistic since properly functioning capital markets 
would act so as to equalize after-tax  returns across assets. The figures do, how- 
ever, show the direction and scale of the effects induced by fiscal reform in the 
past 10 years. 
The Conservative government, since its election in 1979, has seen fit to re- 
duce and to some extent simplify the direct tax system and has also reduced 
the rates of most direct taxes (albeit at the expense of the indirect tax burden). 
Most well known is Nigel Lawson's  penchant for abolishing a tax in every 
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Fig. 3.2  Effective tax rates by asset type, 197W79-1989/90 (basic rate 
taxpayers, constant [10.1%]  inflation) 
Source: Reproduced from IFS Capital Taxes Group (1989). 
what follows we will try to describe the major regime changes in the last two 
decades along with the path of savings-both  at the aggregate level and disag- 
gregated by asset. Obviously we cannot describe every tax change, nor do data 
exist that are powerful enough to fully describe the path of household savings; 
however, in what follows we try  to capture the important factors influencing 
the ETR profiles illustrated above. 
Fewer and Lower  Marginal Income Tax Rates 
The rates and bands of  income tax have important implications due to the 
tax relief at either the basic or marginal rates for deductible asset purchases and 
payments. As is well known, after a period of increasing direct taxes during the 
197Os, there has been a wide-scale removal of direct tax bands and a reduction 
in direct tax rates over the last 13  years. This is illustrated in figure 3.3 and has 
had the effect of equalizing ETRs and therefore fiscal privilege across income 
ranges. It is worth remembering, however, that the number of higher-rate tax- 
payers has always been relatively  small-as  illustrated in the lower part of 
figure 3.3-rising  recently to 6.5 percent of the total number of taxpayers. This 
has arisen as a result of the broad fixing of  the higher rate threshold in real 
terms in a period of real earnings growth. 
Capital Gains Tax 
Two major changes in CGT rules have significantly changed the effective 
tax  rates faced by  households.  First, indexation provisions were introduced 
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Fig. 3.3  Tax thresholds and tax rates since 1973 
times of high inflation. Second, prior to the 1988 budget, CGT was charged at 
a flat rate of 30 percent thus giving higher-rate taxpayers particularly  strong 
incentives to seek returns via capital gains. The switch to taxing capital gains 
at the investor's marginal rate of income tax reduced fiscal privilege but did 
not eliminate it due to the differing bases of the two taxes. Any tax penalties 
associated with CGT were also reduced by a gradual upward trend in the real 
value of the tax-free annual exemption until  1988 when the restructuring of 
CGT rates was combined with a reduction in the real value of the annual ex- 
emption. 
Abolition of the Investment Income Surcharge and the Extension of the 
Composite Rate 
Prior to 1984 the United Kingdom had an investment income surcharge (11s) 
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ment income above a threshold. This resulted in a situation in  1976, say, in 
which income arising from investments was taxed at 98 percent for some indi- 
viduals. The abolition of  the IIS in  1984 and the subsequent reduction in the 
higher rate of income tax have reduced this to 40 percent, although this may 
have been less dramatic than it seems because many people believe that the 98 
percent rate could only persist because it was easily avoided (e.g., by  con- 
verting income into capital gains) and the excess burden reduced (Kay and 
King 1990). 
The composite rate was introduced to ease the collection of a large number 
of relatively small tax payments from building society account income and is 
a weighted average of the marginal tax rates of zero- and basic-rate account 
holders that the building society pays on its total deposits. In 1984  this compos- 
ite rate was extended to bank accounts, thus increasing the number of  tax- 
penalized account holders. Taxation at the composite rate (usually about 21 
percent when the basic rate was 25 percent) represented a significant tax pen- 
alty for zero-rated taxpayers, who could not reclaim the composite rate pay- 
ment, and a slight subsidy for basic- and higher-rate taxpayers. Basic-rate tax 
units were not required to pay the extra (about) 4 percent tax, and higher-rate 
taxpayers were required to pay additional tax only on the interest grossed up 
as if the full basic rate had been paid. 
Introduced only as an administrative aid and almost universally disapproved 
of, the composite rate was eventually abolished in the 1990 budget of the then- 
chancellor, John Major, to wide approval. 
Replacement of Capital Transfer Tar 
The budget of  1986 saw the replacement of the capital transfer tax with the 
inheritance tax. The capital transfer tax had attempted to tax transfers of wealth 
and gifts between the living but had gradually been eroded by base narrowing, 
high levels of avoidance, and rate reduction (Keen 1991) and was therefore a 
good candidate for the chancellor’s ax. In its place a seven-banded inheritance 
tax was introduced, and in the following two budgets the number of bands was 
reduced (from seven to four to one) and the threshold increased to &110,000. 
The threshold has been increased annually to its current level of 2140,000. 
Erosion of the  “Mortgage Interest Relief Deducted at Source” Ceiling 
While there have been no structural changes in the taxation of  mortgages, 
there has been a steady downward trend in the mortgage ceiling resulting in 
the upward trend in the ETR for housing observed in figure 3.2. The ceiling 
for “mortgage interest relief deducted at source” (MIRAS) has been fixed in 
nominal terms at &30,000  since 1983, and 1983-90 has been a period of rapid 
house price inflation; consequently the real value of the tax relief has fallen to 
the point at which almost no new mortgages are entirely covered by MIRAS 
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diminished. In addition, the abolition of tax relief for home improvement loans 
and the switch to MIRAS entitlements being calculated per property rather 
than per tax unit, both in the 1988 budget, have also contributed to this decline. 
More recently, an important MIRAS reform was the replacement of tax relief 
at the investor’s marginal rate by tax relief at the basic rate in the 1991 budget, 
thus  reducing  the  privilege  that  higher-rate  taxpayers  gain  from  saving 
through housing. 
Abolition of  Domestic Rates 
The only value-based tax on housing-domestic  rates-was  abolished in 
1990 in favor of the community charge (or poll tax). This, unlike most changes 
outlined above, served to disperse ETRs among asset types and income groups, 
as it made saving through owner-occupied housing more privileged as the 
value of the house increased. The public discontent with the poll tax is well 
known, and the replacement-the  council tax-although  related to the house 
price by  a nine-banded system, will still not return the taxation of  owner- 
occupied housing to its original status. 
3.2  The Household Balance Sheet 
It is useful, before we look at asset types in more detail, to consider the way 
in which personal sector wealth is distributed both across the population and 
across the different types of assets themselves. While the latter question can 
be assessed from aggregate data, most of the interesting aspects of the distribu- 
tion  of  wealth require some recourse to a microeconomic data set. In  the 
United Kingdom the first preference of most economists is the Family Expen- 
diture Survey, but information on the value of  wealth holdings is extremely 
sparse and unreliable. In general the quality of any one data set is poor, but a 
study by  Saunders and Webb (1988) utilizes a private microeconomic survey 
of 30,000 households carried out in 1987, and we draw on their results in some 
of what follows. 
3.2.1 
In table 3.1 we simply report the concentration of wealth in the United King- 
dom in three recent years, and this shows, not surprisingly, the large amount 
of  marketable wealth held by the top few percentiles of the population. One 
noticeable feature is that although the most wealthy 5 percent have retained 
their share of the total, there has been a slight increase in the share owned by 
the middle percentiles over the past 13 or so years. This trend is evident under 
both definitions of  wealth (including and excluding pension rights), but the 
other predominant characteristic of  table 3.1 is that the wealth distribution 
which does not include pension rights (col. [ii]) is significantly more unequal. 
This emphasizes the importance of  state pension rights that accrue to every 
employed individual in the distribution of personal wealth and also highlights 
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Table 3.1  Concentration of Wealth among the Adult Population 
1916 
% of Wealth Owned by:  (0 
Most wealthy 1%  13 
Most wealthy 2%  18 
Most wealthy 5%  26 
Most wealthy 10%  36 
Most wealthy 25%  51 








1982  1989 
(i)  (ii)  (i)  (ii) 
11  18  11  18 
15  24  16  25 
24  36  26  38 
34  49  38  53 
56  12  62  15 
19  91  83  94 
Source: Inland Revenue (1990). 
Note: For col. (i). wealth is as defined in U.K. Inland Revenue Statistics (ser. E), i.e., the current 
valuation of  total marketable wealth including occupational and state pension rights. In col. (ii). 
wealth is as defined in U.K. Inland Revenue Srarisrics (ser. C),  i.e., excluding all rights accruing 
to individuals under occupational and state pension schemes. 
the need for a consistent and relevant definition of wealth itself. 
Given this breakdown we might be interested to know the structure of port- 
folios within different wealth and income categories, and these breakdowns 
are presented below. It is important to bear in mind that factors influencing the 
differential choice of assets by differing population groups can often be related 
to the kinds of  variation in ETR described above. For example, there is an 
association between risk and fiscal privilege because, for tax purposes, gains 
that arise from the change in value of  a tradable asset are treated as capital 
gains and therefore are taxed more lightly than interest payments. Risk-averse 
investors will tend to choose less risky, usually nontradable, assets, which also 
tend to carry a greater tax penalty. In addition, tradable assets tend to have 
higher holding and transaction costs and require greater information (this is 
clearly the case for gilts and equity, but  also for the Business Expansion 
Scheme-see  below-which  has been highly privileged in the past). These 
fixed costs tend to become more significant when small amounts are invested 
and can lead to concentration of certain types of financial assets by income or 
wealth population subgroups. It is probably not feasible for small investors to 
hold well-balanced portfolios, and they may  well simply resort to low-risk, 
less-privileged forms of  saving that cost less to administer and also are more 
liquid. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show exactly these symptoms. When the population is 
broken down by  income or wealth range, there is a clear shift toward equity 
and away from bank and building society deposits for the richer investors. 
Nonfinancial or less-liquid assets such as housing or life assurance have sig- 
nificantly lower information costs but are still tax-privileged and consequently 
have wider take-up, as can be seen from table 3.4. These assets provide a privi- 
leged tax status to a much wider group of  the population and will therefore 66  James Banks and Richard Blundell 
Table 3.2  Holdings of Financial Assets by  Investor’s Wealth 
Investor’s Level of Wealth 
TOP  Bottom 
% of Savings Held in:  1%  2%-5%  6%-25%  26%-75%  25% 
Bank and building society accounts  34.2  68.4  76.9  83.8  83.5 
Equity  42.0  21.1  13.9  6.4  7.5 
Gilts and local authority bonds  16.6  1.2  0.3  0.0  0.0 
Tax-free National Savings  3.6  2.7  2.4  1  .0  0.8 
Other National Savings and savings clubs  3.6  6.7  6.6  8.7  8.2 
Source: Saunders and Webb (1988). 
Table 3.3  Holdings of Financial Assets by Tax Rate 
% of Savings Held in:  Zero Rate  Basic Rate  Higher Rate 
Bank and building society accounts  71.0  68.8  51.8 
Equity  7.7  20.4  34.3 
Gilts and local authority bonds  3.5  3.4  4.5 
Tax-free National Savings  1.8  2.1  5.9 
Other National Savings and savings clubs  15.9  5.4  3.3 
Source: Saunders and Webb (1988). 
offset, to a certain extent, the wide disparity in tax status of the portfolios of 
different population subgroups that is implied by the take-up and ETRs on the 
liquid assets reported in tables 3.2 and 3.3 and figure 3.1. 
Finally in  this  section we  report the  distribution of  aggregate personal 
wealth over various asset types in 1989. It can be seen from table 3.5 that over 
60 percent of U.K. wealth is held in the form of housing or pension rights and 
life assurance. Of  the &579  billion of wealth held in pensions and insurance 
funds, f275 billion is held through life assurance companies, and f213 billion 
of this is life assurance itself (as opposed to pensions)-almost  10 percent of 
personal sector wealth (Association of British Insurers 1990). Saving through 
life assurance is addressed in more detail in section 3.5. However, the heavily 
penalized bank and building society deposits still account for one-eighth of  net 
wealth, between them, and this proportion has remained constant over recent 
years reflecting, perhaps, the attractiveness of  the reduced riskiness of  such 
a portfolio. 
3.2.2 
There have been a large number of  changes to the savings regime in the 
United Kingdom in the past few years, both in the structure of  existing taxes 
and tax rates. and in the addition and removal of new taxes themselves. The 
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path of  personal saving has also been variable, with positive saving taking 
place in the 1970s, despite persisting negative real interest rates, and a recent 
and well-documented fall in the saving rate throughout the 1980s illustrated in 
figure 3.4. 
Although a consistent series of  wealth data is quite difficult to find, it is 
possible to construct such a series from 1975 from the personal sector balance 
sheets in the U.K. National Accounts (1987) and Economic Trends (August 
1991). In figure 3.5 we present a time series of proportions of total net personal 
sector wealth for six selected asset types. The most striking feature is obvi- 
ously the doubling of the proportion of wealth held in pensions and life assur- 
ance since 1979, and this has occurred with the progressively increasing attrac- 
tiveness of  contracted-out pension schemes and life assurance. In addition, 
however, there has been  a gradual fall in the proportion of  wealth held as 
shares, and this represents a switch from holding equity directly to holding it 
through some intermediary (e.g., the pension fund). Finally, bank and building 
society deposits have held their share at around  12 percent, even in the late 
1970s when real interest rates were negative and such accounts were being 
massively penalized by being taxed on nominal gains. 
Table 3.4  Proportion of Investors Holding Less-Liquid Assets by Tax Rate 
Zero Rate  Basic Rate  Higher Rate  Asset 
Savings-based life assurance policy  39.1  46.7  54.1 
House owned outright  23.0  22.0  27.6 
House with mortgage  8.7  42.1  60.6 
Source: Saunders and Webb (1988). 
Table 3.5  Distribution of Personal Wealth by Asset Type, 1989 
Value (E  billion)  % of Total  Asset Type 
Housing (net of mortgages) 
Pension and insurance funds 
Bank deposits 
Building society accounts 
U.K. securities and unit trust units 
Consumer durables 
National Savings 
Gilts and other interest-bearing assets 
Agricultural and commercial land and buildings 
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Fig. 3.4  Personal saving as a percentage of disposable income, 1968-90 
Source: CSO (1992). 
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The most recent figures for flows of saving of different assets are for 1990, 
and these are presented in table 3.6. Unfortunately, the series for dwellings and 
durables ceased to exist after 1989, so we omit housing and mortgages and 
consumer durables in what follows. 
3.3  The Taxation of Capital Income 
As briefly mentioned in section 3.1, the main personal taxes that are relevant 
to this paper are income tax and CGT, and the taxation of most capital income 
is related in some way to these rates. This has not always been the case, as is 
clear from section 3.1.2 above. An  individual pays income tax at either the 69  Taxation and Personal Saving Incentives in the United Kingdom 
Table 3.6  Personal Sector Asset Flows, 1990 
Asset Type 
Financial Surplus or Deficit 
(& million) 
Pension and insurance funds 
Bank deposits 
Building society accounts 
U.K. securities and unit trust units 
National Savings 
Gilts and other interest-bearing assets 




-  13,536 
783 
-  1,209 
-  134 
Source: CSO (1991b). 
basic rate of  25 percent or the higher rate of  40 percent on eamed income 
above their personal allowance, but they also pay National Insurance (NI) con- 
tributions of 9 percent on earnings falling between prescribed limits. National 
Insurance is described in more detail in section 3.4, but the important fact for 
the taxation of  capital income is that such income is not liable for NI. When 
we talk about the investor’s marginal rate in what follows, we refer to the mar- 
ginal rate of income tax, not the “true” marginal rate of income tax plus NI.3 
Bearing in mind the caveat in the introduction concerning saving through 
direct investment, capital income can broadly be split into three categories- 
interest income, dividends, and capital gains. Income from capital (i.e., rent) 
is simply taxed as other income. 
Interest income and dividends are usually taxed at the same rate-the  invest- 
or’s marginal tax rate-and  the only difference between their tax treatment 
might be the timing of the tax payments in some cases. An imputation system 
exists for all dividend payments, so basic-rate tax is deducted at source, and 
higher-rate taxpayers are required to pay the extra 15 percent in tax every six 
months. Higher-rate taxpayers are required to complete a tax return annually 
(unlike basic-rate tax units, of  which only a few are sent tax returns in any 
given year), so the interim tax payment is estimated. Most interest income also 
has income tax deducted at source, again at the basic rate. Such a system usu- 
ally exists for bank and building society accounts for example, and again a 
higher-rate taxpayer will pay the tax difference later in the year. On the other 
hand, some interest income (e.g., that from National Savings) is net of tax, and 
tax  payments are deferred. In both  these cases, zero-rate taxpayers require 
some form of refund. For interest income they can simply provide a certificate 
of  zero-tax status to qualify for removal of  income tax deductions at source, 
3. In fact, the threshold above which an individual ceases to pay NI lies below that at which 
they move on to the higher rate of income tax, resulting in the well-known fall in the true marginal 
direct tax rate-from  34 to 25 percent-as  income rises over the NI ceiling (f20,280) but before 
it reaches the higher rate threshold (at least f27,145). 70  James Banks and Richard Blundell 
but for dividend income zero-rate taxpayers are required to claim a tax rebate 
at the end of the tax year. 
Since the 1988 budget, indexed capital gains above the annual E6,OOO ex- 
emption have also become taxable at the investor’s marginal rate of  income 
tax. In addition, any chattels that have a value of &6,000 or less on disposal are 
automatically exempt from CGT and do not count toward the individual’s an- 
nual exemption, whereas chattels with a disposal value above this but a capital 
gain of less than the exemption earn marginal relief. The main exemption from 
CGT is that of gains realized on disposal of  an individual’s principal private 
residence, and this accounts for much of the tax-privileged status of housing, 
but certain other assets also have exemption from CGT. These include gains 
arising from occupational pensions, sales of  motor vehicles, decorations for 
valor(!), certain gilt-edged stocks and qualifying corporate bonds or options 
for these stocks, life assurance policies, betting winnings, gains of  approved 
pension schemes, gains accruing to authorized unit trusts, gains of unit trusts 
for exempt unit holders, contracts for deferred annuities, and gains within per- 
sonal equity plans (see below). Retirement relief of E150,OOO plus 50 percent 
of gains up to E600,OOO (i.e., a maximum of E375,OOO) is available for individ- 
uals age 55 and over. 
Finally, savings can ultimately become liable to inheritance tax under certain 
circumstances. Under the inheritance tax rules, the first E140,OOO  of any be- 
quest on death or in the seven years preceding death is tax-free:  and above 
that bequests are taxable at 40 percent on the value over E140,OOO. This tax is 
payable immediately by  the beneficiary. Inheritance tax exemptions apply to 
some bequests, including lifetime transfers between spouses (i.e., when the 
bequestor is still alive), gifts of up to &3,000 per year, gifts to political parties, 
and trusts for the mentally or physically disabled. 
3.4  Retirement Saving and Pensions 
Pension rights make up a significant proportion of personal wealth-about 
15 percent in 1989-and  saving in the form of pensions in particular is quite 
heavily tax-privileged. Pension regulations have also been  an area of rapid 
change in the United Kingdom in recent years, with much work being done by 
economists in this area. In this  section we  look at the treatment of  saving 
through the various types of pension schemes and the extent to which these 
schemes have been taken up, and then in section 3.5 we turn to the treatment 
of life assurance policies. 
Any U.K. worker has a certain amount of pension rights arising from their 
NI contributions (NICs). National Insurance is paid by  every employee on 
4.  Transfers within seven years of death are taxed on their value on the date of death but subject 
to a tapering scale going down to 20 percent of  the full charge for transfers between six and seven 
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Table 3.7  Composition of Retirement Income 
Source of Income 
Wages and salaries 
Self-employment 
Investments 
Annuities and pensions 
Social security benefits 
Imputed income from owner-occupation 
Other 
% of Gross Normal Weekly 








Source: CSO (1990). 
earnings falling between the lower earnings limit (LEL) and the upper earnings 
limit (UEL), and by employers on any earnings above the LEL. Once an indi- 
vidual’s total NICs rise above a minimum level, he becomes entitled to the 
basic state pension. In addition, all individuals are, by default, contracted into 
the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), which is calculated on 
the total amount of contributions paid. The individual can, however, choose to 
contract out of  the SERPS into either an occupational pension scheme or a 
personal pension plan (PPP), and they are then entitled to the “contracted-out 
rebate” on some of their NICs, which is paid into the approved pension scheme 
by  the  government. Rules governing contracting out have  been  frequently 
changed in the last five or so years, and the contribution and tax structure of 
all three forms of pensions is described in more detail below. For the individ- 
ual, the major savings choice is whether, and how, to contract out, and therefore 
we will concentrate mainly on personal and occupational pensions (in particu- 
lar, personal pensions) in what follows, describing the SERPS only as the alter- 
native against which to base the decision. Broadly, however, the U.K. pension 
tax system exempts pensions from tax (i) when contributions are made and 
(ii) when income is derived from investments but levies tax when benefits are 
withdrawn from the fund. 
In  1989, one-fifth of  the income of retired households in the U.K. Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) was  derived from annuities and private pensions, 
despite the fact that PPPs will have  had negligible effects on retirement in- 
comes so close to their inception in 1986. The complete breakdown of income 
of retired households in the 1990 FES is given in table 3.7. A comprehensive 
description of the FES as a data source can be found in Kemsley, Redpath, and 
Holmes (1980). 
The replacement rate for retired households (and indeed for all households) 
falls continuously as a function of  household preretirement income, as retire- 
ment  and social security benefits are not means-tested (although there is a 
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3.4.1  SERPS and the Basic State Pension 
National Insurance contributions are paid at a rate of  9 percent by  every 
individual on earnings falling between &54  per week (the LEL) and &405  per 
week (the UEL) and at 2 percent on the first E54 per week (if earnings exceed 
the LEL).’ Employers pay contributions in banded rates varying from 4.6 to 
10.4 percent on all earnings over the LEL. The LEL is set annually by regula- 
tion and must, by statute, be approximately equal to the value of the basic state 
pension for a single person. In turn, the UEL must lie between six-and-a-half 
and seven-and-a-half times the LEL. Individuals who contract into the SERPS 
receive a pension based on a cumulated fraction of their average annual earn- 
ings falling between the LEL and the UEL. In calculating pensions entitle- 
ments, annual earnings are revalued in line with an index of earnings, but the 
earnings limits themselves are linked to the basic state pension, which is only 
revalued  in line with prices. The price indexation  of the UEL in particular 
seems likely to cause a compression of  SERPS entitlements relative to those 
that would arise from a symmetric indexation of earnings and the earnings 
limits. National Insurance contributions are not income tax-deductible,  nor, 
since the scheme is pay-as-you-go, is there any real fiscal privilege attached to 
the investment of accumulated contributions. 
3.4.2  Occupational Pensions 
Occupational pension schemes were originally the only alternative for an 
individual who wanted to contract out of the SERPS. They typically offer a 
“defined-benefit scheme,” in which pension benefits are based on an earnings 
formula. In the 1986 Social Security Act, however, the government widened 
the range of schemes into which an individual could contract out. Occupational 
schemes must offer a guaranteed minimum pension based on average indexed 
earnings during years within the scheme, although they are typically more gen- 
erous than this. A replacement rate (i.e., the pension payments themselves) of 
up to two-thirds of  final salary is permitted, and one-and-a-half  times final 
salary can be converted into a lump sum on retirement. 
Employees and employers are entitled to the contracted-out rebate on their 
NICs. This currently stands at 5.8 percent of  earnings between the LEL and 
the UEL-3.8  percent applicable to employers’ contributions and 2 percent 
applicable to employees’ NICs. Employers’ contributions can be offset against 
corporation tax, and employees’ contributions can be deducted from their tax- 
able income. Any income or capital gains from occupational funds are exempt 
from tax, as is the converted lump sum, but pensions in payment are taxable at 
the normal rate of income tax. 
5. The 2 percent introductory NI rate was introduced in the 1989 budget, replacing a 5 percent 
starting rate on all NICs if the level exceeded the LEL, which in turn replaced  an even more 
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3.4.3  Personal Pensions and “Money Purchase” Schemes 
As mentioned above, the 1986 Social Security Act significantly widened the 
number of  schemes into which an individual could contract out, most im- 
portantly allowing “defined-contribution schemes,” in which the returns to in- 
vestment essentially depend on the real rate of  return of  assets in the fund 
rather than on the real earnings growth which underpins the SERPS and all 
defined-benefit schemes. This led to the advent of personal pensions (individ- 
ual defined-contribution) and also “money purchase” schemes (group defined- 
contribution). Such pensions can be bought in addition to investments in occu- 
pational pension schemes, and these are “free-standing additional voluntary 
contributions” (FSAVCs). 
The benefits of contracting out into personal pensions are even greater than 
those of occupational pensions because the government simultaneously intro- 
duced an extra two-percentage-point rebate to encourage the take-up of per- 
sonal pensions. This is valid until April 1993, and in addition, for people con- 
tracting out before April 1989, the incentive was paid for the previous two tax 
years as a lump sum into the scheme. These are added to the existing rebate, 
and the whole contracted-out rebate is then grossed up to account for the in- 
come tax relief, resulting in a total rate of  contribution to  the fund of  8.46 
percent of eligible earnings. As with an occupational pension, individuals can 
then  supplement this with contributions from their earnings up to the pre- 
scribed maximum, which ranges from 17.5 percent of earnings for a 35-year- 
old to 35 percent of earnings for someone over age 56, and these contributions 
are deductible against income tax. A tax-free lump sum can also be withdrawn 
from a defined-contribution scheme on retirement, and this can be a maximum 
of one-quarter of the value of the accumulated fund. 
3.4.4  The Take-Up and Coverage of Personal Pensions 
The incentives to take up personal pensions at the expense of NI revenues 
have  been criticized for being too generous by  many  groups, including the 
National Audit Office, and initial take-up has exceeded expectations by a fac- 
tor of eight-4.6  million individuals have taken them up since 1988, represent- 
ing 20 percent of the working population. Coverage of defined-benefit schemes 
in comparison stands at about half the total employed, or 11 million people. 
Figure 3.6, taken from Disney and Whitehouse (1992), illustrates the striking 
rates of take-up for groups in the working population differing by age and sex. 
Indeed, Disney and Whitehouse cite this as evidence contradicting the claim 
that younger workers often exhibit myopia as to their retirement income 40 
years in the future. 
As would have happened with a switch from defined-benefit to defined- 
contribution schemes, though, this take-up of personal pensions has not been 
coincident with a large reduction in occupational schemes, the coverage of 
which has stood at around one-half the working population  since the mid- 74  James Banks and Richard Blundell 
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Fig. 3.6  The Take-Up of Personal Pensions by Age 
Source: Reproduced from Disney and Whitehouse (1992). 
1960s. Employees have either contracted out for the first time into personal 
pensions or have taken a personal pension in addition to a defined-benefit 
scheme. 
Once again, contracted-out defined-contribution schemes are relatively new 
in the United Kingdom, and as yet, figures on the distribution of asset holdings 
within pension funds are difficult to calculate. For occupational pensions, how- 
ever, some data exist, and these are presented for three recent years in table 3.8. 
3.5  Saving through Life Assurance 
Although there are rules governing the amount of insurance that life assur- 
ance policies must contain, in reality, by far the largest portion of the value of 
such contracts lies in the sum which is paid out at the end of the contract. Hills 
(1984) quotes a figure of  1 percent of the premiums paid as the actuarial value 
of  the insurance element alone. For simplicity, in this section we follow the 
tradition of most analyses of life assurance in the United Kingdom and assume 
that the pure insurance element in such a scheme is nil. 
In 1989 the value of life assurance holdings was f213.4 billion-about  10 
percent of  personal sector wealth holdings. Yet  the tax privilege associated 
with this form of  saving is not that large. Life assurance policies are often 
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Table 3.8  Distribution of Occupational Pension Fund Assets 
% of Fund Held in:  1981  1986  1991 
U.K. equities  52  55  58 
Overseas assets  13  21  28 
U.K. fixed interest  23  15  4 
Sterling cash  3  3  6 
U.K. index-linked gilts  1  2  2 
Property assets  8  4  2 
Source: Pensions Pocket Book (1992) 
tax, this is misleading as the insurance company itself is liable to tax on the 
returns that it earns on invested funds. The taxation of life assurance companies 
is, however, complex and also rather cumbersome. Profits have to be allocated 
between policyholders and shareholders, and companies pay tax at the basic 
rate on dividends, corporation tax on any interest income, and the basic-rate 
CGT on capital gains; these taxes combine, in theory, to a tax rate which a 
basic-rate taxpayer would face (although there are some rules on franked ver- 
sus unfranked income that mean a life assurance portfolio is actually margin- 
ally less attractive than the same portfolio held independently). 
Higher-rate taxpayers are required to pay an exit charge equal to the differ- 
ence between the basic and the higher rates if they withdraw funds before the 
maturity date. This charge is only levied on the difference between withdraw- 
als and total contributions (unadjusted for inflation) and also depends on the 
length of time the policy has still to run. 
The complexity of  issues in the taxation of financial intermediaries, how- 
ever, means that it is difficult to say whether life assurance policies are on the 
whole privileged or penalized for the basic-rate taxpayer. This has not always 
been the case, as life assurance premiums have earned full tax relief in the past. 
In the budget of 1984, tax relief on life assurance premiums was ended for new 
contracts. Even nontaxpayers benefited from this relief as it was deductible 
at source from premiums, and the reform considerably reduced the privilege 
associated with life assurance. However, premiums on policies taken out be- 
fore that date still receive tax relief at the investor’s marginal rate.6 
Given the discussion above, it would appear difficult to understand why life 
assurance is such an important element of personal saving in the United King- 
dom. To some extent this can be explained by the large existing stock of poli- 
cies taken out when privileges were still enormous due to the tax relief  on 
premiums. The other important factor, however, has been the increased inci- 
dence of tying life assurance into mortgage borrowing by means of endowment 
6. Despite the supposed secrecy of  the U.K. budget process, it is well known that the two-week 
period prior to the announcement (and in particular the night before) saw a monumental escalation 
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mortgages. The housing boom of  the late 1980s created a massive increase 
in personal sector mortgage borrowing, of which most was financed through 
endowment mortgages (where the household repays only the interest on the 
loan and takes out a life assurance policy to repay the principal when the mort- 
gage expires). Indeed, 64.9 percent of the premium value of new annual life 
policies taken out in 1991 was mortgage-related (calculated from Association 
of British Insurers [1992]). 
3.6  Tax-exempt Accounts and Targeted Incentives 
Over the last few years a number of initiatives have been implemented with 
the aim of  increasing and directing personal saving. Major schemes usually 
occasioned acronyms-TESSAs,  PEPS, and BES-and  have enjoyed varying 
degrees of success as described below. Personal pension plans were another of 
these savings initiatives, but have been detailed separately in section 3.4 above. 
3.6.1  Tax-exempt Special Savings Accounts 
Tax-exempt special savings accounts (TESSAs) were introduced in the Fi- 
nance Act of  1990 to encourage small savers. From January 1991, investors 
aged 18 or over were able to open one TESSA with an approved bank or build- 
ing society. Any interest earned on a TESSA is entirely tax-free provided the 
savings are left in the account for five years, although it is possible to withdraw 
some of  the interest as it arises (equal to the net-of-tax interest). Withdrawal 
of capital at an earlier date leads to complete loss of the tax advantage. 
There is a limit of &3,000  for savings in TESSAs in the first year and &1,800 
for each subsequent year, subject to an upper limit of &9,000  in total over the 
full five years. These savings can be made in single, regular, or irregular pay- 
ments, and TESSAs are designed to be as flexible as possible. After five years 
any further interest on funds becomes liable for tax in the usual way, although 
the investor can simply open a new TESSA and transfer E3,OOO  into it in the 
first year. 
Obviously TESSAs have not been in existence long enough for their impact 
to be analyzed comprehensively, but table 3.9 shows that they have already had 
a quite substantial impact. As more figures become available it will become 
clear whether these numbers represent an addition to aggregate saving or sim- 
ply a diversion of existing (probably bank and building society) funds. At pres- 
ent it appears that there has been a simple transfer of existing building society 
funds into TESSAs, which would result in a big take-up initially, followed by 
a much reduced flow. 
3.6.2  Personal Equity Plans 
In his 1986 budget, the then-chancellor, Nigel Lawson, announced the intro- 
duction of personal equity plans (PEPS)-a  new measure in the government’s 
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Table 3.9  The Take-up of TESSAs 
Building Society 
Accounts  Bank Accounts  All Accounts 
Number  Amount  Number  Amount  Number  Amount 
Quarter Ending:  (thousands)  (E million)  (thousands)  (E million)  (thousands)  (f million) 
March 1991  1,351  3,487  73 1  1,654  2,082  5,142 
June  1991  1,613  4,222  858  2,025  2.47  1  6,247 
Source: Inland Revenue (1991). 
paper to debate the benefits or otherwise of wider share ownership per se, but 
the introduction of PEPs in 1986 was an important initiative designed to lure 
the first-time investor into saving in the form of U.K. equity. Investors in PEPs 
are exempt from income tax on dividends arising from shares held in a plan, 
and in addition there is no capital gains tax when shares are sold. This com- 
pares favorably with the normal tax treatment of equity or unit trusts. Indirect 
investment via a unit trust or an investment trust is permitted, and the adminis- 
tration of the plans is carried out by approved plan managers. In 1991 PEPS 
were extended to cover shares in companies in other EC member states. Indi- 
viduals can put a lump sum into a plan or a regular amount, and PEPs may be 
“managed”  or “own choice” (where the investor makes the portfolio deci- 
sions). 
In January  1992, PEPS were split into two subplans-the  “single-company 
PEP’ and the “general PEP’-and  investors are now allowed to subscribe to 
one of  each of  these in any one year. The limit  for investing in  a  single- 
company PEP is E3,OOO and for a general PEP is E6,000, so an investor taking 
full advantage of the two plans can invest E9,OOO.  Initially, PEPS were set up 
on a calendar year basis and investments were required to be retained and divi- 
dends reinvested for one year to qualify for tax relief. Since April 1989, how- 
ever, the maximum permitted investment has been calculated on a fiscal year 
basis, and the minimum holding period has been abolished. 
It is clear that the government engaged in a substantial amount of tinkering 
with the PEP rules, and this represents a response to poor initial take-up, which 
can be seen in table 3.10. Lee and Saunders (1988) use the same survey as 
Saunders and Webb (1988) to show that less than  1  percent of their sample 
were PEP investors and that of these only a low proportion  were first-time 
investors. They give a number of reasons for this initial failure of the scheme. 
The first factor is the disillusionment with the equity market in general follow- 
ing the crash of October 1987 and the outbreak of  insider-dealing scandals. 
But even before then, investment in PEPS was still very limited compared with, 
say, unit trusts. In addition the tax advantages may not actually be that substan- 
tial to the small investor. Recall that the current CGT exemption is &5,800  of 
real gains per annum, anyway, so the PEP exemption is of absolutely no addi- 78  James Banks and Richard Blundell 
Table 3.10  The Take-up of PEPs 
Number of New Plans  Amount Invested  Average Amount per Plan 
Period  Taken Out (thousands)  (f million)  (f) 
1987  270 
1988  120 
1989/90:  1  580 









Source: Inland Revenue (1991). 
tional value to most  of  the population. The income tax  exemption is also 
clearly of more value to higher-rate than to basic-rate taxpayers, and from 1983 
to 1988 the average dividend yield was typically around 4.5 percent compared 
with average capital gains of 17.5 percent, so the income tax incentive was less 
important anyway (Lee and Saunders 1988). Consequently, PEPs have received 
criticism for being incorrectly targeted and failing to appeal to the small, first- 
time investor. 
Against these tax advantages, saving through PEPs also has three negative 
features. First, they have relatively high administration charges compared with 
other forms of investment, such as unit trusts, mainly due to government regu- 
lations on the administrative responsibilities of plan managers and the fact that 
stamp duty and dealing costs are borne by the investor. Second, initially there 
were substantial restrictions on the way  that PEP investment was allocated, 
with only one-quarter allowed to be invested in unit trusts and most equity 
being restricted to shares in one to five companies. This was not  sufficient 
for investors to achieve a diversified portfolio within the plan, and PEPs were 
relatively risky to the small investor. Finally, at their introduction, the one-year 
holding period meant that the PEP investor was effectively locked into the 
U.K. equity market with a relatively illiquid asset. 
As shown in table 3.10, the relaxation of PEP rules in the light of this poor 
initial response appeared to have significant effects on the amount of  saving 
through PEPS:  with the number and size of new plans increasing almost two- 
fold after 1988. The targeting of PEPs (through income tax and CGT exemp- 
tions) has remained problematic, with some of the drawbacks outlined above 
remaining relevant, and the overall effect seems to be one of deepening share 
ownership among current investors rather than widening the holdings of equity 
among noninvestors. Despite this, the government remains committed to PEPs 
and promises to expand the scheme in the future. 
7. There is now a lower limit of  f1.500  for PEPs that fail to meet a 50 percent  EC  equity 
criterion in addition to the split into single-company and general PEPs, the change in holding 
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3.6.3  The Business Expansion Scheme 
The Business Expansion Scheme (BES; formerly the Business Start-up 
Scheme) was designed to help small unquoted companies raise finance, but, 
viewed as a personal savings vehicle, also presented considerable tax advan- 
tages to the individual investor. The BES was introduced in 1983 and provides 
full tax relief at the investor’s highest rate on new investments of up to &40,000 
in qualifying U.K. trading companies, provided that the shares are held for a 
minimum of  five years and that the shares were being newly issued (i.e., not 
traded). In  1988 the scheme was extended to cover investment in companies 
letting properties on assured tenancies. Individuals may invest in an approved 
investment fund or may use unapproved funds or syndicates provided that the 
individual becomes the actual owner of the shares. Dividends are taxed in the 
normal way but any capital gain will be free of CGT. 
Indeed, the attractiveness of BES funds that is derived from their tax posi- 
tion completely dominates any incentives arising from the expansion of  the 
business itself, encouraging investment in companies that do little more than 
hold assets for the five-year period. Consequently, the BES has fallen out of 
favor. It is already essentially a lame duck, and all the major political parties 
are committed to abolishing the scheme in the near future. 
The take-up of BES shares since the scheme’s inception in the early 1980s 
has not been spectacular despite the massive concessions available, with E211 
million being raised between 916 participating companies in 1989-90.  With 
the introduction of rental companies into the scheme the year before, however, 
the figure was temporarily higher-raising  &420  million for 2,5 11 companies. 
3.7  Conclusions 
In  this paper we  have tried to sum up the main issues in the taxation of 
saving in the United Kingdom and to describe to some extent the form in which 
personal-sector wealth is held. The tax regime for savings is far from simple, 
even when one chooses to ignore the complexities of the distinction between 
saving and direct investment, but, even so, many anomalies of  the past have 
been (or are in the process of being) ironed out. 
Broadly speaking, the tax system gives high privileges to saving through 
housing and pensions, mild privileges to gilts, equity, National Savings, and 
some unit trusts, and penalizes bank and building society accounts (sight ac- 
counts). The size of  tax privileges, however, depends on time-, asset-, and 
individual-specific factors. There also seems to be some systematic relation- 
ship between risk and fiscal privilege, and this has sometimes been interpreted 
as the tax system’s encouraging risk-taking. 
The government has introduced a number of  initiatives to encourage saving 
in various forms but, with the exception of personal pension plans, these have 80  James Banks and Richard Blundell 
appeared  so far to  simply  deepen  savings from  existing  savers rather  than 
widen particular asset holdings among first-time or small investors. In contrast 
to savings plans such as the individual retirement account in the United States, 
these incentives have been asset-specific rather than simply encouraging any 
form of saving. The schemes are really too young for an evaluation of  their 
success or failure, whether this be measured by a redirection of or an increase 
in personal saving. Initial evidence, however, seems to suggest that aggregate 
saving has not been strongly affected by  special incentive schemes (with the 
possible exception of personal pensions). 
Finally, in the past 20 years there have been substantial reforms to the taxa- 
tion of savings and capital income and also marked trends in the personal sec- 
tor’s holdings of assets. Most noticeable of these is the enormous increase in 
the proportion of  wealth held in pension funds, which has resulted in the two 
most privileged forms of household saving (pensions and housing) now ac- 
counting for over 50 percent of net personal sector wealth. 
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